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Abstract 
An unconscious sense of the body in all higher mammals is located in somatosensory and motor 
cortices, colloquially referred to as the Homunculus (H). The time has arrived to consider how H might 
engage in the dimensions of selfhood that go beyond embodiment. Surely, the neural network modules 
that process various dimensions of selfhood must at least access and interact with the H or a stored 
memory of it. In this review, I suggest that our traditional understanding of H is much too simplistic. 
This review specifies a set of experimental approaches that should enlarge our understanding of the 
brain mechanisms of selfhood. 
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1. Introduction 
The reference to We Three refers to the somatosensory and motor cortices and the unexplored 
possibility that these neural circuits integrate with other systems in the brain in the instantiation of the 
unconscious and conscious sense of selfhood. The focus necessarily revolves around cortical areas 
known in older literature as the Homunculus (H). Penfield first described H as a neural map model of 
body parts acting as a mechanistic system for registering which body parts are stimulated and which 
muscles are to be activated during movement (Weiss, 1988). I suggest that H is more than that. 
Maps are useless unless something reads them. H maps are read by other neural circuitry that expands 
the repertoire of sensation and behavior. One could say that the self, unconscious or conscious, reads 
the body maps. What is this self and what contribution does H make to the construction of self-hood? 
Beyond the embodiment aspect of selfhood, H could be relevant to other dimensions of self-hood, such 
as body ownership (Low, 2003; Tsakiris, 2010), agency and willed behavior (Klemm, 2015), 
spatio-temporal location of selfhood (Aspell et al., 2012; Blanke, 2012), mirror neuron processes, 
introspective realization of ownership of thoughts and emotions, and abstract identity as a being 
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distinct from others. How could these dimensions of selfhood exist without reference to the body that 
manifests them?  
While an unconscious sense of self obviously resides in those body maps, a question remains, as to 
how these maps might interact with other parts of brain in the conscious sense of self—the “I” to which 
each person lays claim. Even the brain areas mediating many unconscious thoughts and behavior likely 
interact with body maps. 
Consciousness is a system property of brain that I propose here to use the body maps as a linchpin to 
stitch together the various needed network components. Surely, in order to mediate appropriate 
behavior, the neural network modules processing various dimensions of selfhood must at least access 
the H or a stored memory of it. To illustrate, it is the “I” of my brain who responds emotionally, 
cognitively, and behaviorally to the: 
• Smells and sounds sizzling steak,  
• Touch from others,  
• Coldness of ice,  
• Pain of a stubbed toe,  
• Sound snap of a breaking bone, 
• Sight of my missing limb, 
• Sight of my body parts as I guide their movement, and, most significantly, 
• Awareness that I am an agent engaging with the world around me. 
In addition to shedding light on the nature of conscious sense of self, the experimental approaches 
proposed at the end of this review might advance our understanding of such phenomena as: 
• Narcissism,  
• The angst of anxiety and depression disorders,  
• Illusions of phantom limbs and out-of-body experiences,  
• Hallucinations of schizophrenia, 
• Social withdrawal in autism,  
• Lack of empathy in sociopaths, 
• Loss of identity in such diseases as Alzheimer’s and Capgras syndrome. 
Additionally, the information might guide mental-health research and treatment. 
 
2. Hypothesis 
A popular view is that consciousness emerges from a coherent orchestrated function within a network 
of networks that inevitably includes body maps (Baars, 1983). We need to accommodate the role of H 
in the brain’s basic organization as a network of interacting modules, with hubs that mediate functional 
connectivity among the modules. I propose that body maps are an integral part of network modules that 
construct the various dimensions of selfhood. Selfhood includes more than simple recognition of body 
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parts, but also the abstract “I” identity, subject/object distinction, location of self in time and space, 
ownership of thought and emotion, intentions, and agency. Even the sense of the metaphysical “I” is 
not so abstract as to be divorced from the body. After all, it is the bodily “I” that interacts with objects 
and others, navigates time and space, owns thought and emotions, and acts on intended behavior.  
This hypothesis includes a possible role of H in the conscious awareness of selfhood dimensions. 
Mainstream literature on the bases of consciousness impute a role for body maps (D’Amasio, 2010; 
Thompson & Varela, 2001). See Figure 1 for a schema for these relationships. A recent review explores 
“embodied cognition”, a concept similar to the one presented here that the brain’s sense of embodiment 
could participate in perception, cognition, emotions, and agency (Cardona, 2017). 
 
 
Figure 1. Diagram of the Hypothesis that Body Maps Are an Essential Part of the Brain’s 
Representation of Self-Hood 
 
The maps are embedded in a global workspace of general brain operations. Inputs to somatosensory 
cortex arrive not only from spinothalamic tracts but also from multiple regions of cortex and elsewhere; 
motor cortex receives input from cortical areas other than somatosensory cortex, and its outputs have 
well-known projections via the pyramidal tract and extrapyramidal routes to basal ganglia, brainstem 
nuclei, and cerebellum in the global workspace (see section, “Relevant Anatomy”). By “motor cortex” I 
mean not only M1 but also the premotor and supplementary motor cortices, which notably receive rich 
input from the posterior parietal association cortex and which have reciprocal connections with H’s 
primary motor cortex (reviewed by Akkal et al., 2007; Hamadjida et al., 2016). 
We can extend the thrust of Figure 1 by incorporating research on interacting brain modules (Huettel et 
al., 2004; Bassett & Sporns, 2017). For example, there are localized cortical circuits for somatic 
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sensation, movement control, mirror neurons, speech, sound, vision, facial recognition, and for 
executive control. H is surely one of the brain’s modules, but its body maps likely lack sufficient mass 
of circuitry of their own to generate the multiple facets of a sense of personhood. 
If body maps ae involved in ways other than embodiment as such, they may operate differentially in 
each selfhood dimension. For example, the cold winter day makes our whole body uncomfortable, a 
stubbed toe causes pain just in the affected toe, and the deliberate control of body parts varies 
depending on the situational context that prompts willed and controlled movement. Perhaps it is time 
for network models to have a hearing (Fig. 2). 
 
Figure 2. Putative Functional Connectivity of Modules Constituting the Network of Self-Hood 
 
The brain areas performing a given selfhood module’s functions are not entirely known. Interactions of 
the embodiment module (H) are suggested. The embodiment module depicts multiple nodes within it to 
reflect not only the distinctive sensory-motor functions, but also the mapping of multiple spinal 
segments. Which of these nodes connect to other modules under various circumstances remain 
undiscovered. 
 
3. Rationale and Evidence for the Inseparability of H and Dimensions of Selfhood 
Brains construct and interpret simulated mental models of reality. Our selfhood, whether explicitly 
perceived or not, is situated in those simulations. 
Human sensorimotor cortex shows synchronous “resting state activity” in the brain’s “Default Mental 
Network” (DMN) when the brain is not engaged in a task (Biswal et al., 1995). The hypothesis here 
predicts that DMN will change functional connectivity when the brain switches to tasks that engage the 
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various dimensions of self-hood. The nature of the change would likely vary with the specific nature of 
selfhood (embodiment, bodily location, ownership of thoughts and emotions, willed behavior and 
agency, and so on). 
While direct evidence for the hypothesis is scant, sufficient support for this idea seems to justify 
experiments of the kind explained in the last section of this review. Support falls into two categories: 
psychophysical experience and functional neuroanatomy. 
3.1 Psychophysical Experience 
3.1.1 Multisensory Integration 
All the senses have different processing zones in the brain. How do they get stitched together in 
creating the sense that it is “I” who simultaneously feels, sees, hears, smells, etc. or the “I” who intends, 
plans, and executes bodily movement? 
Unisensory areas in somatosensory cortex process multisensory information by oscillatory entrainment 
of neuronal networks via direct cortico-cortical projections (Bieler, 2017). Note that this was one of the 
few studies to examine temporal distribution of impulses as it may relate to selfhood, a point revisited 
in the section here on Relevant Analytical Techniques. 
One example of multi-sensory integration is that human intracerebral electrical responses to 
non-painful stimulation of median nerve spread from multiple somatosensory zones to motor cortex 
and multiple non-H neocortical areas and persist for some 200 msecs after stimulation ends (Avanzini 
et al., 2016). The hand region alone encompassed a widespread network covering more than 10% of the 
cortical surface of both hemispheres. An initial phasic component of the response occurred within 
primary somatosensory, motor, premotor, and inferior parietal regions, and additionally a tonic 
component lasting more than 200 msecs in opercular and insular areas.  
Non-topographic sensory information affects how motor cortex modulates movement control in the 
context of personal and extrapersonal space (Serino et al., 2009). Mirror neurons provide another 
indication that body maps would be needed for “embodied simulation” that is required to mimic the 
behavior of others (Gallese, 2005).  
Brain scans of arm-movement and grip-force manipulation clearly show increased activity in a large 
portions of H associated with the prediction of sensorimotor feedback from the efference copy of motor 
commands (Imamizu, 2010). 
Another multi-sensory integration example is that during a hand-grasping task in monkeys, neurons in 
the motor cortex formed strong interconnections with premotor cortex and anterior inter-parietal cortex 
(Dann et al., 2016). Certain neurons had extensive connections with other neurons in the network, and 
their rhythmic activity at fixed frequencies seemed to coordinate information routing in the network.  
Bodily posture processing requires multi-sensory integration. “Posture neurons” in the parietal cortex 
track egocentric body-part position via their reciprocal connections with motor cortex and 
somatosensory cortex and even parts of auditory and visual cortex. In rodents, about half of the parietal 
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and motor cortex neurons are topographically tuned to postural features of head, neck, and back. 
Posture and body location in space are related by the connection between hippocampal place neurons 
and parietal cortex (reviewed by Chen, 2018). 
Multisensory integration apparently even operates in such non-bodily selfhood functions as speech 
perception and language understanding. Transcranial magnetic stimulation and fMRI studies reveal that 
ventral motor and somatosensory areas of H participate (Schomers & Pulvermϋller, 2016). 
3.1.2 Higher-order Evaluation of Sensation 
For example, in humans conscious selective attention regulates activity within somatosensory cortex 
and suppresses noise inputs (Iguchi et al., 2004). This is possible because somatosensory input is 
processed in multiple brain regions, not exclusively in the cortical sensory map. 
Consider the subjective pain response to nociceptive stimuli. People vary widely in their subjective 
experience of pain, though they all presumably have the same H neural circuitry. The mental model the 
brain constructs for nociception must surely modify the interpretation of activity within H. 
In the case of visual sensations, embodiment may seem relatively irrelevant. However, as visual input 
spreads into dorsal and ventral pathways of visual cortex, visual signals segregate to produce activity 
patterns that represent related features of visual stimuli (category, spatial location, color, texture, 
motion, etc.) (reviewed by Kosslyn & Koenig, 1992). Complete processing requires access to the body 
maps. For example, in the sub-network categorical processing of “What is it?” a look-up process will 
ascertain, “It is not me”. In the coordinate subnetwork, look-up will ascertain “Where is it with respect 
to me?” The “me”, of course, is found first in the body maps and then in whatever networks create the 
virtual “me”. 
Other features of conscious awareness would obviously involve other brain areas. Even though 
body-part representation is necessary, other brain areas likely interact with H to mediate functions such 
as ownership, valence, and salience of sensations, and planning of behavioral response. This 
necessarily engages multiple cortical networks that have reciprocal connections with the H. The 
egocentric meaning of such functions cannot be divorced from the body. It is “I” who see, hear, behave, 
etc. 
3.1.3 Evaluation of Semantic Meaning 
MRI mapping of semantic meaning shows that the meaning of most words activates more than one 
zone of neocortex, and H is richly engaged in processing meaning of hundreds of words that go far 
beyond simple embodiment. For example, almost all areas of somatosensory and motor cortex become 
active upon hearing a huge array of adjectives and nouns with diverse meanings involving abstract 
dimensions of personhood, cognition, and emotions (Huth et al., 2016). Notably less represented are 
words dealing with social interactions and time. 
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3.1.4 Self-consciousness 
Self-consciousness entails a sense of body ownership, and this requires integration of sensory activity 
with activity in premotor and parietal cortex (Petkova et al., 2011; Ehrsson, 2012; Maselli & Slater, 
2013; Blanke, 2012). Maselli’s (2015) review of studies of self-location in full-body illusions suggests 
that body map neurons likely engage with multiple other brain areas (see below) to produce a cohesive 
combination of knowing one’s body and knowing where it is.  
Topographic mapping of body regions creates a template for matching and summating the map 
representations into a bodily whole (Petkova et al., 2011). This mapping allows creation of a single 
perceptual state that represents a first-order awareness of the body and perhaps its extended notion of 
self-hood. Once this first-order state exists, it can progress to a higher-order consciousness (HOT) 
(Carruthers, 2016).  
Body movement commands require interaction with mapped sensory experience (Legrand & Ruby, 
2009). Psychological studies are largely limited to body schema (Graziano & Botvinik, 2002), leaving a 
huge gap of possible H roles in emotion, cognition, and behavior.  
In two brain-scan studies involving full-body illusions, sense of body location arises from a cognitive 
blend of egocentric body mapping with allocentric coding of the body’s location (Maselli, 2015). 
Memory of where one has been located in space is tracked via the hippocampus, suggesting integrated 
activity between H and the hippocampus. 
People who have out-of-body experiences retain their sense of selfhood (Blanke, 2012; Metzinger, 
2004). Such experiences are rather common under influence of certain drugs (ketamine) or virtual 
reality illusions (Metzinger, 2004). In one of Metziner’s illusions, he could see a 3-D image of himself 
standing in front of him, and if someone scratched his back, he felt the sensation happening to the body 
standing in front of him. Yet, despite this projection of selfhood, his selfhood remained trapped within 
its real skin. This suggests that H constrains reality to the actual body while at the same time having the 
capacity to contribute to a projected model of selfhood to the virtual image. 
Self-hood-relevant affective consequences of somatosensory activation likely involve interaction 
between H and the limbic system. For example, brain functional imaging compared activity when a 
volunteer experienced pain and when told that a loved one who was in the same room was receiving a 
similar pain stimulus. The actual receipt of nociceptive stimulus to oneself activated sensorimotor 
cortex and posterior insula/secondary cortex, but the empathic response to the perceived loved one’s 
pain was associated with bilateral activation in the anterior insula, anterior cingulate cortex, brainstem, 
and cerebellum. The authors concluded, “Only that part of the pain network associated with its 
affective qualities, but not its sensory qualities, mediates empathy”. 
3.1.5 Selfhood and Otherness 
Body maps inform the brain there is a self that operates in a non-self external environment. For 
example, guiding movement of the body in relation to nearby objects requires integrating a neural 
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representation of body schema and objects in the peri-personal space around the body (Holmes & 
Spence, 2004). 
An example of the inseparability of H’s role in self-hood and embodiment comes from the discovery of 
place cells in the hippocampus and grid cells of entorhinal cortex (Stensola & Moser, 2016). This 
spatial location system must include H in order to allow the brain to know where its body resides in 
space.  
Self and “other” construction include one’s own bodily mapping as the frame of reference. It is “I” who 
see you and references your bodily actions with respect to me and mine to yours. Mirror neurons, 
which mediate mimicking the movements of others, seem likely to have undiscovered connections with 
multiple areas of brain. 
3.1.6 Selfhood and Executive Control 
Motor cortex control of movement has numerous “upstream” influences from outside of H. This 
includes influence on motor cortex from auditory and visual inputs. Decisions may arise from 
competitive processes within H and its interacting without the need for an “I” authority figure (Miller, 
2000). Perhaps such processing helps to create the illusion of an “I” controller.  
3.1.7 Expression of Personality in Handwriting 
The handwriting analysis community contributes to the rationale for this hypothesis. H directs the 
movements of handwriting, and yet handwriting is a rather specific indicator of one’s personality and 
psychological state. Handwriting analysists claim that handwriting provides strong clues on people’s 
states of mind, their character, temper, skills, emotions and even their physiology and brain health level. 
This would seem to be prima-facia evidence that multiple brain areas engage H, given that handwriting 
cannot be generated without engagement of both sensory and motor maps of hand and arm. Various 
kinds of brain damage and mental abnormalities produce distinctive changes in handwriting properties 
(Seifer, 2002). This should not be surprising, inasmuch as a review of 18 imaging studies indicated that 
handwriting activates widespread areas of frontal and parietal cortex and the cerebellum (Planton et al., 
2013). 
Recent neurological research demonstrates that the learning process of handwriting produces structural 
changes in the brain (James, 2019), improves the ability of children to generate written text (Jones & 
Christensen, 1990), affects word- and sentence-level working memory (Berniger et al., 2010), and 
builds a sense of writer identity and self-efficacy (Snyders, 2014). 
One distinct way that non-H parts of brain affect handwriting is that visual illusions of hand ownership 
alter connectivity between H and inferior parietal cortex (Faivre et al., 2017). EEG gamma activity 
increased between left sensorimotor cortex and inferior parietal cortex during visual illusions of hand 
ownership. Subjective ownership correlated with the synchrony of somatosensory signals from the two 
hands. Hand ownership was stronger in subjects that had stronger alpha suppression over the 
sensorimotor cortex. 
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3.2 Functional Neuroanatomy 
In all areas of neocortex, adjacent cortical columns link H to adjacent non-H areas by horizontal spread 
of axial dendrites at the pial surface and by intracortical project paths originating from pyramidal cells 
in cortical layers II and III. 
The best known intra-map connection is the cross-hemispheric connection via the corpus callosum 
(Miller, 1975). The fiber tracts of the internal capsule provide multiple connections within and between 
each hemisphere and with the multiple circuits that contribute to conscious self-hood (Mountcastle, 
1998). 
Excitatory outputs from primary somatosensory cortex innervate widespread regions of motor cortex 
(Zarzecki, 1989). Apparently, we know much less about how different regions within each 
hemisphere’s body maps communicate with each other. One study revealed that activity in one digit 
region of somatosensory cortex could inhibit the activity in another digit's field (Chowdhury & 
Rasmusson, 2003). One has to wonder about intra-H functions in the various dimensions of selfhood 
other than embodiment. 
3.2.1 Somatosensory Inputs 
The main sensory input to H comes mainly from spinothalamic tracts and thalamic VPL and VPM, but 
other inputs provide the brain with other kinds of information. For example, visual inputs do project to 
somatosensory mapped areas, in both mice and monkeys (Wang et al., 2012). Anatomical studies 
(Miller & Vogt, 1984) establish that areas 17, 18a, and 18b of rat visual cortex have connections with 
both sensory and motor cortex. Area 18a has reciprocal connections with sensory cortex. Motor areas 
have reciprocal connections with visual areas 17 and 18a and with many associational areas of cortex. 
Thus, cognitive, emotional, and behavioral responses to visual sensation do register in H. 
Functional connections exist between body maps and both the insula and anterior cingulate cortex 
(Avanzini et al., 2016). Thus, a brain that has experienced somatosensory pain has learned to respond 
by activating affective components of pain, presumably by the inherent connections involving 
somatosensory maps, the pain network, and the limbic system.  
Insular cortex is an integral component of the limbic system that seems to participate in several 
conscious selfhood-relevant functions, such as empathy, perception, motor control, self-awareness, 
cognitive functioning, and interpersonal experience. In the cat, the granular insular area projects to a 
constellation of somatosensory, motor, premotor and prefrontal districts. The dysgranular insular area 
links to lateral prefrontal and premotor, lateral somatosensory and perirhinal cortices (Clascá et al., 
2000).  
3.2.2 Somatosensory Outputs 
Sensory inputs to somatosensory cortex spread to other non-mapped regions of cortex, and thus give H 
the connectivity needed to participate in various dimensions of selfhood beyond embodiment. For 
example, mapped snout inputs in pigs project into other non-mapped regions of cortex (Tanosaki et al., 
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2014). The barrel cortex region of somatosensory cortex of rats sends outputs to other areas of the 
sensory map and also to diffuse long-range projections to primary auditory and visual cortex (Stehberg 
et al., 2014). 
In rats, projections of somatosensory cortex modulate activity of innocuous and noxious inputs in the 
spinothalamic system (Monconduit et al., 2006). Glutaminergic activation of somatosensory cortical 
output enhances noxious-evoked responses, while GABAA-mediated depression of corticofugal output 
suppresses noxious tactile-evoked responses of thalamic VPL cells. Given pain’s dependency on 
consciousness, such results suggest that somatosensory cortex outputs may contribute to consciousness 
in general, not just to mapped perceptions. 
Sensory cortex sends outputs to corticifugal neurons in motor cortex of cats (Zarecki, 1989). The 
primary sensory cortex connects with secondary sensory cortex and sends “massive” projections to the 
thalamus, brainstem, and spinal cord (Purves et al., 2017). Another example is that selective mapped 
responses to both tactile and nociceptive stimuli spread into other cortical areas, even in newborn 
babies (Verriotis et al., 2015). 
3.2.3 Motor Cortex Inputs 
Motor cortex has multiple inputs, especially from cerebellum, globus pallidus, and substantia nigra. A 
major source of input comes from premotor cortex, which in turn receives input from widespread areas 
of frontal cortex of monkeys (Muakkassa & Strick, 1979). In the macaque, motor cortex receives inputs 
from somatosensory cortex, parietal cortex, and thalamus, as well as inputs from premotor cortex 
(reviewed by Passingham, 1993). In the cat, input to motor cortex was identified by antidromic 
activation from cerebral peduncle, red nucleus, lateral reticular nucleus of medulla, or spinal cord. 
Recent studies of mice (Hooks et al., 2013) revealed long-range excitatory synaptic connections, 
particularly in upper layer pyramidal cells, from multiple cortical and thalamic areas. 
3.2.4 Motor Cortex Outputs 
Major outputs of motor cortex include not only the pyramidal tract, but also projections to the striatum, 
pallidum, and certain brainstem areas (subthalamus, red nucleus, substantia nigra) (Wise & Shadmehr, 
2002). Given these multiple efferent projections of these areas, motor cortex must surely be central to 
multiple selfhood functions. 
Chen et al. (2009) reviewed three fMRI studies showing neural interactions between auditory and 
motor areas during conscious perception of music. No doubt, this accounts for the toe-tapping response 
to strong rhythms. 
 
4. Testing the Hypothesis 
Research must move beyond reductionist methodology in order to understand the network dynamics 
that underlie higher brain functions of selfhood. The important research challenge is to develop suitable 
experimental approaches for assessing the coupling of H with diverse sensory, cognitive, emotional, 
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and motor modules. Tests should include specific tasks, motor planning, movement control, bodily 
misperceptions, and the effects after experimentally induced dysfunction. We need also to evaluate 
neural activity in H and related modules during various dimensions of self-hood along the 
sleep-wakefulness continuum. 
4.1 Relevant Analytical Techniques 
4.1.1 Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
Brain scans, though increasingly popular, suffer the disadvantage that they measure metabolism, not 
signaling. Moreover, blood flow changes may occur upstream or downstream from the actual site of 
neurons that are changing their signaling activity. Magnitude of image changes is always small and 
subject to undue contamination by statistical noise and variability (Crew, 2016). Most importantly, it is 
likely that significant changes in nerve impulse patterns and connectivity timing can occur without 
requiring a change in over-all metabolism across a range of mental and behavioral states (Dubois, 
2016).  
Recording conditions typically require immobility, which limits the kinds of tasks that we can test. 
Subjects must have a high tolerance of claustrophobia, and the distractions of loud noise from the 
magnets inevitably affect brain function. Most imaging studies only report increases in activity, 
whereas decreases do occur and likely have major functional significance. 
Activated areas often diminish as the subject rehearses and masters assigned tasks. Presumably, novel 
experiences require recruitment of more neural resources for processing than is needed after much 
practice and learning.  
Nonetheless, the several MRI studies noted above support the proposed role of the body maps in 
conscious sense of self. MRI may indeed have sufficient sensitivity for certain functions, as indicated in 
hand-movement studies, by a high degree of temporal correlation within different regions of motor 
cortex and with time courses in several other motor-related areas (Biswal et al., 1995).  
MRI scans might mislead us by false negatives. Also, scans would have little value if the switching 
between various cognitive states were short-term transients. In such cases, only unit activity or field 
potential measures would have the necessary temporal resolution. This fact gains standing in light of 
recent studies suggesting that consciousness operates in movie-like snapshots rather than as a 
continuous stream (Herzog et al., 2016).  
4.1.2 Electrophysiological Methods 
Electrophysiological measures include nerve action potentials and their proxy, the field potentials, as 
seen for example in the EEG. Unlike MRIs, electrical signals have fine time resolution, and with 
implanted electrodes, the spatial resolution limitations of field potentials may not be too limiting. The 
various frequency bands in field potentials are an especially useful metric (Buzsáki, 2006), because 
changes in conscious mentation are strongly associated with frequency-specific coherence changes, 
both cross-frequency and between various regions of neural networks. 
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An especially pertinent portion of the field potential frequency band is gamma activity, which is more 
prominent, relative to other frequencies, during wakefulness than during sleep or anesthesia. Especially 
worth investigating would be gamma coherence between H and non-mapped areas. Also in need of 
investigation are coherence measures between frequencies in the same areas. 
Gamma activity from body maps may be relatively hard to detect because of the much larger amplitude 
of slower frequencies. High-frequency gamma waves are nested within and “ride on top of” irregular 
slow waves, persisting even in sleep states where the EEG is dominated by alpha and delta activity 
(Steriade et al., 1966a, 1966b). Perhaps a filtered EEG would be more sensitive for showing gamma 
activity changes in different cognitive states. 
Frequency coherence can reflect any cognitive binding mechanism that varies with: 1) nature of 
cognitive task, 2) shifts long the sleep-wakefulness continuum, 3) body misperceptions, and 4) motor 
control and coordination. Synchronization may provide a way to generate the unity of conscious 
self-hood that normal people feel so intensely.  
Synchronization occurs within single columns in separate columns in the same area of cortex and 
between columns in different intrahemispheric and transhemispheric areas. But I am not aware of 
studies of synchronization within cortical maps or between them and other areas of neocortex under 
task conditions. 
Investigators are discovering great utility in the analysis of coherence of cross-frequency relationships. 
For example, a recent EEG study during an arithmetic task, rest, and breath focus, revealed that the 
proportion of epochs displaying a 2:1 harmonic relationship between peak alpha and theta frequencies 
was significantly higher when cognitive demands increased (Rodriguez-Larios & Alaerts, 2019). 
Opposite dynamics were identified for a specific range of “nonharmonic” alpha–theta cross-frequency 
relationships, which showed a higher incidence during rest compared with the arithmetic task. This 
kind of analysis could be useful for studying neural relationships in the context of various dimensions 
of self-hood. 
Synchronization of scalp-derived has limited spatial resolution and is only useful for comparing 
different neocortical zones. We need data from implanted electrodes. If human neurosurgical patients 
are not available, it might be productive to evaluate the sensory and motor maps in a mammalian 
animal species that presumably has a degree of sentience. 
Animal models make it more feasible to monitor actual signaling (action-potential trains) in defined 
circuitry. A common approach employs multi-unit activity, which is “noisy”. One multi-unit attempt at 
dimensionality reduction of impulse discharges uses a two-stage process where spikes trains are 
smoothed over time and then a static dimensionality technique is applied to allow tracking neural 
trajectories over time. Such an approach has been used with monkey motor cortex to relate the spiking 
activity across a neural population to the monkey's behavior on a single-trial basis (Byron et al., 2009). 
For a given dimension of self-hood, the information content of a single spike train is not particularly 
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meaningful, compared to the multiple spike trains in all the neurons in the network that processes that 
particular aspect of self-hood. 
Investigators usually assume that the information content in spike trains resides in firing rate. However, 
there is clear evidence that individual neurons generate information also in the serial ordering of 
adjacent interval clusters, suggesting byte-processing (Klemm & Sherry, 1981; Sherry et al., 1982; 
Sherry & Klemm, 1984). I called such activity, “Circuit Impulse Patterns (CIPs)” and suggest that they 
are the fundamental representations of thought, emotions, and action (Klemm, 2011a). Unfortunately, 
to evaluate function in network modules in terms of interval coding requires sophisticated 
combinatorial statistical methods that do not yet exist. A complete understanding of impulse activity 
will require “revisiting” the role of body maps in terms of CIPs, not the usual methods involving fMRIs, 
field potentials, or even smoothed multi-unit firing rates. 
4.2 Suggested Categories for Study of H-related Neural Activity 
Either field potential or unit activity needs evaluation within H and between H and other networks 
under test conditions where the state of self-hood is selectively controlled. 
4.2.1 Various Dimensions of Selfhood 
The emotional dimension of selfhood provides rich opportunities for investigating H’s possible role. 
The H is highly responsive to emotion-laden sensory input, such as the pain of stubbing a toe. 
Somatosensory zones do not scream for conscious attention when looking at a work of art. However, 
we are consciously aware that it is the “I” that is looking at the art, and we distinguish others who may 
be having their own view of the art. Perhaps our viewing launches a coherent co-activation of multiple 
zones in H or with visual and limbic networks. Nobody has tested such possibilities, though an 
approximation could be accomplished with experimental animals. The approach would be conceptually 
simple: implant electrodes in visual and limbic areas and an electrode array that spans several zones of 
somatosensory cortex. Then the field potentials at each electrode can be analyzed for frequency 
coherences while the animal attends an emotionally rich visual target. Using images of different 
salience and valence could disclose stimulus-specific coherence patterns that involve H. 
Among the important variables to be evaluated is cognitive meaning of affective stimuli. For example, 
a touch can convey affection, clothing, or object contact (with different meanings depending on the 
object and situation). In response, muscle activation commands might indicate reflex aggression, 
affection, withdrawal, object manipulation, and so on. It seems likely that one could identify a role for 
H by constructing a topographic dictionary of the various physical and emotional conditions in which 
the sense of self participates. There might be value in evaluating activity in various states of 
consciousness. 
Another variable is location in space, wherein: “I know where I am and where others are”. A recent 
study advances understanding of self-location knowledge by recording the electrical activity of “place 
cells” in the hippocampus that fire impulses selectively when an animal is at certain locations within an 
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enclosure (Danjo et al., 2018). This study revealed that place cells not only coded self-location but also 
location of another rat in a T-maze. How does the hippocampus know it has a self to locate without 
direct connections with H? It seems likely that H is an integral part of an undiscovered larger circuit 
that communicates with hippocampal place cells in the construction of the virtual sense of self. 
Also, how does the hippocampus know where the other rat is located? Well, of course, one rat can see 
or smell the other rat, but that information somehow has to get to the place cells. As far as I know, the 
connecting pathways have not been identified, except that there is a rather direct pathway from 
olfactory bulbs to the hippocampus. Rats may be like dogs; that is, to a dog another dog is a dog 
because it smells like a dog. The nose knows, and this includes self and other.  
Activity patterns in body maps should likewise vary with the proximity of non-self targets in personal 
space. Electrical recordings would likely disclose which dimensions of self-hood are most heavily 
associated with body-map activity. Examples of manipulating states of self-hood could include the 
following: 
• Embodiment: body awareness, various body positions or motions or the ways in which one 
perceives positions or motions. 
• Body ownership: ownership perception with body-part illusions, proprioceptive manipulations, 
avatar projections. 
• Spatio-temporal location: location learning testing, spatial skills tests, spatial illusions, elapsed 
time estimation, time illusions.  
4.2.2 Task Specificity 
Experiments should include monitoring brain activity during different kinds of tasks. It would likely be 
useful to examine functions comparing cognitive tasks that are abstract and impersonal versus those 
that require robust engagement of the “I”. For example, function might be quite different when a 
subject looks at a drawing, makes a drawing, or imagines an original drawing. Other examples: 
compare activity when hearing a song, mentally constructing a melody, meditating without silent verbal 
chatter, and targeted verbal thinking. For motor functions, we might compare a well-learned simple 
pattern of finger tapping versus a complex and novel pattern of tapping. Other examples: having a 
finger or hand passively moved versus intentional movement or randomly scribbling versus writing 
words in elegant cursive or by printing. 
It might also be useful to compare tasks that involved only a restricted portion of a body map. For 
example, we might compare electrographic patterns when viewing a scene versus viewing that scene in 
a computer game in which the subject controls specific body-part movement of an avatar. Other 
examples: tapping a pattern with one finger versus simultaneously tapping a different pattern with a 
finger on the opposite hand or pressing a button when seeing a cued visual target versus simultaneously 
pressing a button and tapping a foot and whistling. 
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4.2.3 Shifts Along the Sleep-wakefulness Continuum 
H connectivity with multiple other cortical areas should vary at different points along the 
sleep-wakefulness continuum. We might predict that when the brain shifts from unconsciousness to 
consciousness, investigators will see unique connectivity shifts involving the body-map areas, both 
without and perhaps within the maps. Comparing responses to nociceptive stimuli is an obvious place 
to start. 
Somatosensory areas likely possess neural correlates of varying states of consciousness (Koch et al., 
2016). This supposition is readily testable by comparing neural correlates in sensory cortex areas when 
one is consciously aware of personal involvement in a situation and when one is not. Interestingly, one 
of Koch’s hypotheses is that explicit representation of a stimulus requires an “essential node” of 
neurons that detect the feature without much processing. If so, body mapping could well be that 
essential node for conscious sense of self. 
A common belief is that multiple modules operate in parallel and conduct much of their processing 
unconsciously (Dehaene & Nacchache, 2001). In that view the brain becomes aware of this information 
consciously when there is top-down “attentional amplification” (and/or noise reduction) of the activity 
in certain of these modules that have become “coherent”. When conscious attention engages H, the 
sense of self certainly becomes explicit and may amplify. How would that be reflected in H 
engagement with relevant brain areas? 
Do body-map functions differ when one is conscious of personal engagement and when not? 
Differences surely occur at the level of motor function. As a player in a basketball game, I experience 
the conscious state of being in the game, but when shooting a free throw, I must selectively engage 
portions of my motor cortex in some of the planned movements. In both cases, how can I play the game 
without the conscious experience of my participation? 
One rather obvious experiment could involve study of neural responses in mapped and non-mapped 
areas to a low-level stimulus of various body parts during various levels of wakefulness and 
attentiveness by the same subject. Of special interest would be such studies in patients who have 
deficient sense of ownership of certain body parts, as in the condition known as asomatognosia. For 
example, how would electrical responses compare when the patient is asleep versus awake? 
4.2.4 Body Misperceptions 
Bodily misperceptions in contrived laboratory experiments seem to occur without much engagement 
with body-map circuitry. However, these sensory manipulations are not the normal way humans locate 
their own body parts. The illusion research findings can result from a mismatch of conflicting senses. 
Moreover, these illusions do not trick everybody. Perhaps activity in H varies accordingly. 
Bodily representation necessarily involves a wide range of sensory stimuli (visual, auditory, vestibular, 
and visceral) and motor signals and their feedback. A review of the existing literature indicates that 
bodily illusions arise because of misinterpretation of ambiguous or conflicting multisensory inputs 
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jpbr              Journal of Psychology & Behavior Research               Vol. 2, No. 1, 2020 
 
31 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
(Aspell et al., 2012; Kilteni et al., 2015). These sensory inputs must surely register in somatosensory 
cortex. 
4.2.5 Motor Control 
Electrical recordings could elucidate the motor dimensions of H function as an animal mentally 
rehearses a complex series of movements it has been trained to perform or even suppress. For example, 
you could test for frequency coherences from an electrode array that spans several motor cortex zones 
and electrodes in other brain areas with functions relevant to the task. 
Accurate goal-directed movement requires the brain’s sense of self to assess a motor command in terms 
of targeting, sensor prediction, adaptation, and error correction. How can this not involve body maps? 
A well-known phenomenon of motor control involves the idea that a motor command to muscles 
generates a feed-forward copy (efference copy), distributed to sensory cortex, as an internal model that 
is used to predict the anticipated sensory feedback and compared with the actual sensory feedback 
resulting from the movement (Von Holst & Mittelstaedt, 1950). Efferent motor signals and their 
feedback re-enter the brain by way of bodily mapped sensory receptors as an afference copy. Both 
sensory and motor bodily maps must inevitably be engaged in such a process, but this likely possibility 
has apparently not been studied extensively (Wolpert et al., 1995). 
4.3 Experimentally Induced Dysfunction of Body Maps 
It is not appropriate to produce lesions in the cortical maps of humans, though temporary effects of 
local anesthetics could be feasible. However, we can conduct psychophysiological evaluation of people 
with disease-caused damage, such as cardiovascular stroke. Such studies should extend beyond the 
usual evaluation of limb neglect. 
However, stroke and other damage usually creates only partial loss of body sense. Transcranial 
Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) might provide a more complete and reversible inactivation of the cortical 
maps (Silvanto & Muggleton, 2008). Such experiments could allow selective assessment of the various 
sense-of-self dimensions. After TMS manipulation of H, investigators could ask subjects how they 
experience various cognitive situations and tasks. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Because H is one of the modules in the brain’s global network, this review presents rationale, evidence, 
and suggested experiments for testing the proposed hypothesis that the H may likely participate 
differentially with other modules in the various dimensions of selfhood, not just embodiment. We can 
expect that interaction of mapped and non-mapped areas is task- and mental-state specific. 
Understanding these interactions could elucidate the mechanisms of consciousness. 
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